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Foreword 
Richard Snape capped a long and distinguished career as Professor of Economics at 
Monash University with a new and accomplished career at the Industry 
Commission, and then as Deputy Chairman of the Productivity Commission. In the 
eight years that he spent at the Commission before his untimely death in October 
2002, he played a pivotal role in overseeing our research program, as well as 
participating in major public inquiries. 
This is the tenth in a series of lectures in memory of Richard Snape. With Richard’s 
own interests and high standards in mind, the lecture series elicits contributions on 
important public policy issues from internationally recognised figures, in a form 
that is accessible to a wide audience. 
We are honoured to have Pascal Lamy, Director-General of the World Trade 
Organization, present this year’s lecture. Mr Lamy’s distinguished career includes 
high level appointments in both the public and private sectors, as well as in 
academia. Prior to taking up his current position in 2004, he was Commissioner for 
Trade at the European Commission, and before that, CEO of Credit Lyonnais.  
In this year’s Richard Snape Lecture, Pascal Lamy draws on his extensive insight 
into international trade liberalisation to discuss the future of the multilateral trading 
system in the present era of global economic uncertainty.  
I am extremely grateful that he was able to take time out of his busy schedule to 
come to Melbourne to deliver the 2012 Richard Snape Lecture.  
Gary Banks AO 
Chairman 
November 2012 
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Richard Snape 1936 – 2002 
Richard Hal Snape was Deputy Chairman of the Productivity Commission and 
Emeritus Professor of Monash University. He was a Board Member of the 
Australian Research Council, Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in 
Australia and a Distinguished Fellow of the Economic Society of Australia. 
Pascal Lamy 
Mr Pascal Lamy has been Director-General of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) since September 2005. 
Mr Lamy holds degrees from the Paris based Ecole des Hautes Etudes 
Commerciales (HEC), from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques (IEP) and from the 
Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA). He began his career in the French civil 
service at the Inspection Générale des finances and at the Treasury. He then became 
an advisor to the Finance Minister Jacques Delors, and subsequently to Prime 
Minister Pierre Mauroy. 
In Brussels from 1985 to 1994, Pascal Lamy was Chief of Staff for the President of 
the European Commission, Jacques Delors, and his representative as Sherpa in the 
G7. In November 1994, he joined the team in charge of rescuing the French bank, 
Credit Lyonnais, and later became CEO of the bank until its privatisation in 1999. 
Between 1999 and 2004, Pascal Lamy was Commissioner for Trade at the European 
Commission under Romano Prodi. 
After his tenure in Brussels, Pascal Lamy spent a short sabbatical period as 
President of ‘Notre Europe’, a think tank working on European integration, as 
Associate Professor at the l’Institut d’Études Politiques in Paris and as advisor to 
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (President of the European Socialist Party). 
Mr Lamy was reappointed Director-General of the World Trade Organization by its 
Members for a second mandate in May 2009. 
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The future of the multilateral trading 
system 
Pascal Lamy 
I am very pleased to have been asked to deliver a few remarks on the future of the 
multilateral trading system at this the 2012 Richard Snape Lecture Series. Since 
2003 these lecture series have served as a cornucopia of ideas and opinions and I 
hope the dialogue this evening will also offer new and compelling perspectives on 
the changing topography of international trade. 
I say international trade, but the reality of twenty-first century economics is that the 
notion of geography and of a defined marketplace is becoming increasingly 
irrelevant as the DNA of trade continues to transform. The edges between 
international, regional and national trade are becoming increasingly blurred which 
means that trade-related decisions that would previously have been taken in silos 
must now be based on a whole of economy tableau. Policies and decision making 
must become external in reach given that their impacts are now felt beyond the 
borders of the nation state. As Existentialists would say, we are in an ‘age of 
transition’. 
This evening I will speak briefly about this changing landscape of trade — a 
transformation premised on the geo-political shifts that have occurred over the last 
two decades and the exponential reach and impact of technological advances. I will 
also address the growing reach of value chains and touch on the new features that I 
see forming the trade agenda of the future such as trade in value added and non-
tariff measures. Finally I will provide some insight into how the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) is seeking to respond to these changes. 
The rising weight of influence of emerging economies has shifted the balance of 
power. This clearly implies a number of transitions to which we have not yet 
adjusted as classic Westphalia concepts of sovereignty are being challenged by the 
realities of interdependence. Some may consider this a problem, it is perhaps better 
to think of it as an opportunity to look at the real shaping factors of trade. 
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The international trade environment 
First, a word about the current macroeconomic environment and trade growth 
climate — subdued. That is the word I would use. Subdued prospects and subdued 
expectations. I know this may sound a bit too downbeat here in Australia, given the 
high growth rates this country has seen in the last years. But the fact is that the 
global financial crisis of 2007-2008 has left a ubiquitous imprint on international 
trade and global growth. There have been false recoveries, unpredictable growth 
rates and a reassessment in many quarters as to the very theological basis of our 
economic models. 
The old theories and hypotheses which governed the way we looked at trade in the 
twentieth century will require better calibration with the new reality of trade in the 
twenty-first century. Decades from now scholars and policy makers will look back 
on this period as a watershed moment in how we approached trade and economic 
policy. Whether we, collectively, recognised the missteps of the past and learnt 
from them or whether we continued to forge ahead on the road already traversed. 
Was it not Confucius that said one should ‘study the past if you would define the 
future’? 
As we near the end of 2012, the signs are not positive. We are living in a global 
macroeconomic environment in turmoil. Countries are still trying to find 
appropriate exit strategies from the economic crisis and global unemployment 
remains far too high. Although we have seen some positive signals recently, the 
European sovereign debt crisis has not yet retreated and this continues to have 
implications for fiscal adjustment in some of the euro area economies and the 
economic prospects of developing country markets, particularly those in Africa, 
given their strong trade links with Europe. And these economic uncertainties 
continue to lead to social unrest and political turmoil which have far reaching 
implications for global security. 
The WTO recently revised its forecast for trade volume growth in 2012 to 2.5 per 
cent, down from 3.7 per cent in spring. Exports of developing countries and 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are expected to grow by 3.5 per cent 
while exports of developed countries by around 1.5 per cent. These weakening 
prospects reflect the toll that the European sovereign debt crisis and slowing global 
output growth have taken on international trade. 
These figures are hardly surprising. They are in line with the downward revision of 
the International Monetary Fund’s forecast for global growth for this year and the 
lower growth forecast by the World Bank for East Asia of 7.2 per cent this year and 
7.6 per cent in 2013, down from earlier estimates of 7.6 per cent and 8.0 per cent, 
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respectively making this the slowest growth rate in the Asia Pacific region since 
2001. The 2012 growth forecasts for sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America have 
also been revised downwards. On the side of employment, the ILO has forecast that 
in 2013 an additional 7 million people will join the 200-million-strong ranks of the 
unemployed — a vast section of which will be unemployed youth. 
For developed countries, the hindrances to growth include fiscal consolidation and 
bank deleveraging. The euro-zone will see negative growth this year and still faces 
elevated downside risks despite the European Central Bank’s recent policy actions. 
Forecasts earlier this month confirm that Europe’s economic prospects have 
dimmed considerably, with a more drawn-out recovery expected before any 
discernible return to growth. The US is expected to continue along its sluggish 
recovery (2.2 per cent growth). Despite the Federal Reserve’s announcement of 
measures to aid the economy, the U.S. will continue to face headwinds in the form 
of households burdened with large debts and high unemployment as well as policy 
uncertainty because of the looming ‘fiscal cliff’. 
While emerging and developing economies continue to grow, rates are lower than in 
the past. This suggests that the slowdown in advanced economies is spreading to 
emerging countries through lower exports and smaller capital flows. There is some 
volatility in commodity prices which could harm commodity exporters. One silver 
lining is that because of their better economic position, developing economies have 
greater ability to respond with fiscal and monetary stimulus if conditions worsen. 
With such a challenging international background there is always the risk that 
countries may seek to rebalance domestic growth by seeking to protect domestic 
producers. As I described in a recent editorial entitled ‘Learning from the Crisis: 
The Fallacy of Protectionism’ there has been worrying signs of the traditional 
propensity of nation-states to turn inwards when the global economic outlook is 
bad, but for the most part, countries have exercised restraint. There is the fear 
however that if unemployment and economic stagnation persists, this discipline may 
be tested. Protectionism does not work however. Closing off markets would be a 
mistake in a world where hampering imports will actively harm prospects for 
exporting success. Protectionism does not protect. It does not strengthen economies 
and it does not save jobs. Governments protect people by supporting domestic 
economic growth and social protection, not by resorting to short-term policies that 
may benefit the few at the expense of the many. 
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Geo-political transformations 
This is no longer the world of the twentieth century dominated by the US pillar on 
one side and the European pillar on the other. We are in a twenty first century multi-
polar world. Ricardians would see this as a natural progression of comparative 
advantages while the Westphalia model would see this as a breakdown of the order 
of the nation state. I see this as the contemporary form of multilateralism with 
notions of sovereignty being challenged by realities of interdependence. I see this as 
an opportunity. Opportunities for policy makers to take a new look at the forces 
moving trade and political-economic discourse. 
The emergence of some developing countries as key players and as real contributors 
to global dialogue on trade and economics is a fundamental feature of this new geo-
political reality. These emerging powers — China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, South Africa — and many others — Thailand, Chile, Turkey — are no 
longer policy takers. These countries now increasingly influence the pattern and 
scope of international trade, creating new supply and demand pulls and flexing their 
influence in international organisations. These changes in the geo-political and 
economic topography essentially led to the formation of the G-20 as we know it 
today — a group of countries which have an important stake but also a big 
responsibility in global economic governance. 
The global network of imports and exports is no longer just the North-South 
paradigm of the past century. Increasingly we are seeing developing countries as 
producers and as markets for each other and this is one of the growing patterns of 
the new landscape of trade. To illustrate the growing shift, we only have to look at 
the evolution of merchandise trade between developing countries, which has 
expanded considerably in the past twenty years growing much faster than North-
South trade. A recent report by UNCTAD notes that in 2010 South-South exports 
made up 23 per cent of world trade compared to just 13 per cent in 2000. 
Developing countries are now the largest market for other developing countries. 
While this is encouraging, the contribution of developing regions to South-South 
trade is highly skewed. Asian countries make up more 80 per cent of South-South 
trade with the shares of Africa and Latin America being just 6 per cent and 10 per 
cent respectively in 2010. 
South-south trade with a focus on Africa 
We are also seeing growing ties between Africa and China and Africa and India. 
Trade between China and Africa will likely hit upwards of US 200 billion in 2012, 
up 25 per cent year on year. If this trend continues, reports are that Africa could 
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surpass the EU and the US to become China’s largest trade partner in three to five 
years. 
The importance of other developing countries to Africa is even more apparent if one 
excludes fuels and mining products from the calculations. The share of Africa’s 
non-fuels and mining products exports that went to developing countries rose from 
around 30 per cent in 2000 to 50 per cent in 2011. This reflects the fact that Africa’s 
exports to developing countries tends to be more diversified than its exports to 
developed countries. A similar shift in trade from developed to developing 
economies can be seen on the import side as well. The share of developing 
economies in African imports rose from around one third (34 per cent) to more than 
half (53 per cent) between 2000 and 2011. 
If we dig deeper into the types of products being exported we see an interesting 
picture. Recent research conducted by the International Trade Centre on ‘Africa’s 
Trade Potential: Export Opportunities in Growth Markets’ showed that exports to 
traditional markets — Europe — were decreasing and exports were increasing to 
Asia — primarily China — BUT that the share of value-added goods to Europe 
were increasing while the majority of exports to Asia were in primary products. 
The research also confirmed the increase in trading intra-regionally with a shift to 
more value-added goods. Over the period 1995−2010, Sub-Saharan Africa’s exports 
of processed goods and semi-processed goods grew faster than exports of non-oil 
raw products and in terms of intra-regional exports, processed and semi-processed 
goods comprised the largest share of exports at 46 per cent and 41 per cent 
respectively. This trend towards greater intra-regional trade is one that we see 
happening across the globe. It is partly a reaction to the decreased demand, or 
foreshadowing possible loss of future demand, in traditional extra-regional markets 
as a result of the crisis coupled with a realisation of the untapped potential of 
countries in the immediate economic space. The African Union’s decision of 
January 2012 to focus on boosting intra-African trade and identifying 2017 as the 
target date for the completion of the Continental Free Trade Area are examples of 
how policies are beginning to reflect the economic viability of trading closer to 
home in addition to traditional extra-regional trading. 
Trade in tasks 
In addition to the reconfiguration of the actors in the multilateral trading system and 
the changing patterns of trade moving away from traditional North-South lines and 
also incorporating greater intra- and inter- regional trade, we are also seeing new 
trends in the way that goods and services are produced and traded. In essence there 
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is a new narrative developing on trade which governments and business have to take 
notice of and align their policies and priorities around. 
In WTO jargon, we have termed this ‘Made in the World’. Increasingly countries 
are trading in intermediates not final products. The concept of made in country X is 
becoming obsolete as we see the exponential increase of trade in intermediates or 
trade in tasks — where components of goods and services are produced and 
assembled in different countries. The old adage of ‘imports bad and exports good’ is 
made irrelevant when we look at the evidence — today almost 60 per cent of trade 
in goods is in intermediates or trade in tasks and the average import content of 
exports is around 40 per cent. This is why, as I intimated earlier, enacting 
protectionist measures, which could be trade distorting or trade diversionary, will 
actually have an inverse reaction in economies which are increasingly reliant on 
imports to complete their exports. This narrative is already transforming the policy 
debate on trade and hopefully will lead to be more nuanced and evidence based 
decision process that truly reflects the impact that trade can actually have on 
growth, employment and innovation. 
The spoils of trade in tasks are all amongst us. Let us take an iPhone. The legend 
inscribed on the back of an iPhone declares ‘Designed by Apple in California. 
Assembled in China.’ This does not do justice to parts made in China, Korea, Japan, 
Germany, and the US, by companies headquartered in Tokyo, Seoul, Bavaria, San 
Diego, Stuttgart, Texas and Geneva. The pieces, as we know, are put together in 
Shenzhen, China — by a company that happens to be based in Chinese Taipei. The 
iPhone, like more and more products, defies identification by a single country of 
origin. It can only be described as ‘Made in the World’. 
And this is not necessarily a new phenomenon or one that is exclusive to high-tech 
products. By the 11th century AD, a regular trade had evolved in which African 
ivory was shipped to India, where craftsmen carved it into jewellery for export to 
Europe. And consider the story of an opal mined in the highlands of Ethiopia: 
Brought by middlemen from a rural miner to traders in Addis Ababa; Air-freighted 
to a family-owned company in Jaipur, India for cutting and polishing; sold to a US-
based jewellery designer/retailer; and dispatched to Thailand to be set into a 
bracelet and then finally, placed on offer to customers at one of the retailer’s 
authorised dealerships in China, Europe, the Caribbean, or North America. With 
value addition occurring in at least four different countries, that bracelet too, is 
‘Made in the World’. 
This confirms that the way we measure trade needs to change. Our traditional 
methodology assigns the total commercial value of an import to a single country of 
origin. This was an accurate formula when trade was in final goods produced from 
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domestic inputs. It might even have worked when imported raw materials were 
processed in a single country. But when applied to ‘Made in the World’ products, 
the methodology can exaggerate bilateral trade balances and under-state where 
value addition occurs. This incongruence has two main impacts: one, inflated 
bilateral trade numbers which can inflame anti-trade sentiment and two, lead to 
policies which are not aligned with the pace, direction and reality of world 
production and trade. Having an accurate, evidence based methodology of the true 
value of trade is necessary if policy makers are to make informed decisions on trade 
and economic policy. The WTO working with the OECD and many other partners 
will contribute to this effort when we release the first set of comprehensive statistics 
on trade in value added during a conference in Geneva in mid-December this year. 
And I want to pay tribute to the excellent cooperation that we in WTO have fostered 
with our colleagues in the OECD, an example of how inter-agency cooperation can 
help move the policy debate forward. 
Value chains — growth and jobs chains 
The increase in trade in intermediates coupled with decreasing transport and 
communication costs, and greater fragmentation of production across the globe 
requires us to change our narrative on trade. Facilitating this movement in trade in 
tasks are the growing network of national, regional and global value chains which 
are increasingly characterising the trade conveyor belts of the twenty-first century. 
Value chains are not new constructs. They have been around for almost as long as 
the concept of trade has been. 
Value chains represent a dynamic method of organizing production internationally. 
It involves the unbundling of stages of production across different countries based 
on their cost advantages. Increasingly, this process has moved beyond the 
outsourcing of manufacturing production and now involves services activities as 
well, primarily office tasks. Services are fundamental to value chains comprising an 
ever growing component in the value of final products. One sure way to add value 
to raw materials is to increase the range of services you can offer alongside it in the 
form of transport, logistics, insurance, and distribution. This is particularly 
important for those economies which may not have land or mineral wealth and 
which rely on human capital as a form of economic competitiveness. 
Value chains in agriculture, such as in the Agro food or processed agricultural 
products are also important examples of the multi-polar and multi-modal form of 
production and distribution. Just take a recent study by the Food Safety Authority of 
Ireland that found that just one processed chicken food stuff had fifty-three separate 
ingredients. And each of these ingredients had multiple suppliers from different 
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regions in the world. One must also consider the backward and forward linkages 
which connect the agriculture sector to other sectors such as the sugar cane sector 
with its multiple consumer and industrial applications. 
While value chains are not a new phenomenon, their importance is increasing in 
several regions of the world, such as East Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. 
There are two principal reasons why these value chains are valuable to developing 
countries in particular. 
First, they create a lot of trade among the developing countries who are members of 
the value chain. This is because each participating country is likely to specialize in a 
specific segment of the manufacturing process or on a particular office task and the 
resulting intermediate goods will need to be moved among the countries. 
Second, value chains can be vital catalysts for expanding the productive capacity of 
developing countries. Participation in value chains allow enterprises from 
developing countries to find suitable foreign partners, gain access to FDI, become 
familiar with international business practices, and upgrade their skills and 
technology. The shift towards trade in tasks creates opportunities that did not exist 
when trade was dominated by exchanges of final goods. Particularly for smaller 
developing countries, value chains lower the bar for entry into the global economy. 
Companies need not try to produce entire cars, for example, that are internationally 
competitive — they might simply focus on getting a particular auto part right. We 
have seen this in Malaysia and Morocco for example. 
The fact that intermediate goods need to cross the border of developing countries 
involved in value chains multiple times means that the cost of any type of trade 
restriction will be magnified. Not only must tariffs be low but regulatory regimes 
have to be compatible, otherwise non-tariff measures and regulatory divergence will 
prevent the efficient functioning of value chains. This regulatory convergence is 
important in ensuring that value chains really work for countries. 
Non-tariff measures 
Ensuring this regulatory convergence is particularly critical given the increase in 
non-tariff measures (NTMs) which we have seen over the past decade. These are an 
important factor in international production chains as the broad decline in tariff 
levels has meant that non-tariff measures such as technical standards, conformity 
certification, health and safety requirements, and services regulation loom larger in 
international trade than before. 
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This year’s edition of the World Trade Report, the WTO’s flagship research 
publication, examined the evolving landscape of NTMs. One of its most important 
findings was that the nature of NTMs has shifted: the traditional protection-
motivated quotas and safeguards have increasingly given way to a precaution-
oriented emphasis on health, safety, environmental quality, and other social 
considerations. These concerns are wholly legitimate, and cannot — indeed, should 
not — be blindly trumped by a desire to keep trade completely unobstructed. That 
said, the nature of the measures taken to pursue public policy objectives, and the 
way those measures are administered, can have widely varying effects on trade, 
both positive and negative. NTMs should ideally, not increase trade costs more than 
the minimum necessary to achieve their objective. Similarly, it is reasonable to 
argue that NTMs should not be constructed in ways that unduly favour domestic 
interests. Yet, in light of the complex societal objectives and policies in play where 
NTMs are concerned, finding the right balance will require cooperation and 
dialogue. 
Unlike tariff negotiations in the WTO that aim to negotiate to a zero level of tariffs, 
discussions on non-tariff measures must instead focus on transparency, coherence 
and capacity. Transparency is critical. Producers and traders need more information 
about existing NTMs, which are by definition harder to measure and compare than 
tariffs. At the WTO we have created the Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal 
(I-TIP), a one-stop shop for accessing all information notified to the WTO by 
Members, including NTMs, tariffs, trade remedy use, and trade statistics. 
Coherence is needed to ensure that companies do not have to face a series of 
competing standards and requirements and capacity to help companies, in particular 
Small and Medium Enterprises, better understand and adapt to these measures. The 
issue of private standards is particularly important in this regard. In the field of co-
operation there is a need to develop shared understandings about why particular 
measures are used for a certain goal. Distinguishing whether NTMs are being used 
for legitimate ends, or for protecting domestic producers, makes NTMs an elusive 
trade policy tool. 
As NTMs, such as technical product standards, health and safety requirements, and 
related testing procedures, become increasingly pervasive, they can create real 
problems for traders. These measures can be complicated and confusing for 
business, costly to comply with, and can vary significantly from country to country, 
and from sector to sector. It is of course, not the role of the WTO, nor should it be, 
to eliminate NTMs, or even to harmonize them to level the playing field. Rather 
countries must continue to rely on WTO rules and enforcement to avoid any 
discriminatory and unnecessarily trade-restrictive NTMs, and for the rest that are in 
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line with WTO rules, seek to promote regulatory convergence between countries in 
the relevant fora, to minimize differences that can cause trade friction. 
I recognise that convergence among countries at very different levels of 
development is rarely straightforward. Moreover, mutual recognition and 
harmonization can raise tough questions about trust, good governance, and domestic 
regulatory autonomy. Co-operation among governments, in standard-setting bodies, 
regional fora, and multilateral organisations, remains the best way forward. 
However, continuing to provide effective capacity building to help exporters 
comply with NTMs in important markets, or helping governments participate in 
standard-setting are two absolutes. The WTO, through its Standards and Trade 
Development Facility (STDF) continues to provide this assistance to our developing 
members in the field of sanitary and phytosanitary standards. 
How is the WTO addressing these changes? 
The WTO will be eighteen years old in January 2013. In the majority of countries 
we will now be considered an adult! How has the WTO sought to adjust to the 
changes in the multilateral system? When the organization was established in 1995 
there were 76 original GATT members and another 50 nations at various stages in 
the membership process. Today we have 157 members having recently added 
Samoa, Montenegro, the Russian Federation and just recently Laos to the fold. The 
technological and logistics changes in the world of trade have been nothing short of 
transformational and the increase in trade in intermediates has meant we have had to 
find new angles to look at the contribution of trade to growth and development. 
How has the WTO sought to remain relevant in a world where the geo-political 
changes have meant we exist in a different structure today than we did in 2001 
when we launched the current round of negotiations (termed the Doha Development 
Agenda)? As I mentioned at the opening of the WTO’s annual public Forum in 
September this year how do we deal with a system where there is a ‘redistribution 
of the geopolitical deck of cards on a global scale’? 
The WTO has four main pillars of work. The negotiating function which in some 
respects is at a standstill although there is some progress being made in some 
quarters; the Aid for Trade function which includes both coordinating the work on 
Aid for Trade but also providing trade-related technical assistance and capacity 
building to developing country officials; the monitoring and surveillance function; 
and the litigation function housed in our Dispute Settlement arm, which I might add 
is the only global trade judiciary of its kind. 
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The WTO, in many ways, is one of the most successful examples of rules-based 
multilateralism at work. Its capacity to administer and enforce the global trade rules 
especially through its monitoring and surveillance function has been a major input 
into preventing a widespread resort to protectionist measures. Both our in-house 
monitoring and our reporting to the G-20 in this area have kept the international 
community involved and informed. The WTO is not immune to the geo-economic 
and geo-political transformations of our time. The standstill in the negotiations — 
when taken to its very basic level — is premised on the relative contributions that 
Members at different levels of development could or should make. As in other 
organisations and on other issues, such as on climate change, this is a question that 
the international community cannot ignore. To move forward on multilateral 
negotiations this basic question of ‘rights’ versus ‘responsibilities’ must be 
addressed. 
However, it is not necessary to reshape the whole WTO agenda to address this 
issue. Some academics believe that the WTO should start from the beginning again. 
However, this academic approach has limited political relevance. The issues under 
debate in the Doha Development Agenda remain relevant, but the reality is that, at 
some point in the future, the WTO will likely have to combine these issues with 
new areas if the global rule making agenda is to ensure it aligns with what is 
actually happening in markets. 
To quote Vincent Van Gogh ‘Great things are done by a series of small things 
brought together’ and in the WTO Members are seeking to move forward step by 
step in some key areas. One of these where progress is being made and which is 
intimately linked to many of the issues I mentioned earlier such as value chains and 
non-tariff measures is that of trade facilitation. In many respects trade facilitation is 
economics 101. At its core it is about making trade easier and less costly and in a 
world increasingly focused on value chains and trade in intermediates, effective 
trade facilitation is simply not a choice — it is an unquestionable core element in 
any country or business policy decision if the aim is to grow and attract investment. 
The evidence speaks for itself — every extra day required to ship goods, reduces 
trade by 1 per cent. On an average sea voyage of 20 days, one extra day at sea 
results in 4.5 per cent drop in trade between any two trading partners. Overall, the 
OECD estimates that for its Members, the fees, formalities and clearance 
procedures constitute roughly 10 per cent of the value of any trade transaction. This 
is almost double the worldwide average trade weighted tariff. Globally, that is close 
to $2 trillion. A WTO deal on trade facilitation would reduce those costs from 10 
per cent of the value of trade, to 5 per cent of its value. 
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The negotiations at the WTO have the potential to deliver real and tangible results 
to countries at all levels  a truly ‘win-win’ deal. And for the first time, we have 
the structure of an agreement which would be premised, not on exemptions for 
developing countries, but rather on helping them to build the capacity to adopt the 
same measures that even the most developed member will adopt. This is an 
important, and some may say, seismic shift in how countries are approaching 
negotiations. 
There has also been some important progress on issues related to Least-Developed 
countries (LDCs) with the recent adoption of a package to streamline the accession 
of LDCs to the WTO, and work is moving forward on the operationalization of a 
waiver allowing WTO Members to provide preferential access to LDCs in the area 
of services. 
Work on the Government Procurement Agreement is proceeding well with the deal 
reached in December 2011 to expand the sectors covered by around $100 billion 
worth in new market opportunities. Not only will this inject greater transparency 
into the tender processes thereby helping fight corruption in procurement, but 
greater competition in the bidding will also enable governments to shop around for 
the best prices, delivering better value for money for taxpayers and keeping tighter 
rein on spending. Members are currently finalising the accession of new members 
such as China to this agreement. The implications of that are self-evident. Work is 
also continuing on expanding the Information Technology Agreement which has the 
potential to spur innovation and create jobs in the important area of information 
technology. 
On the Aid for Trade front, the WTO continues to lead, along with the OECD, on 
the Aid for Trade global work programme. The resource mobilisation pillar has 
been incredibly successful with over US$45 billion committed in Aid for Trade in 
2010, the highest amount ever. The programme has fostered a culture of trade 
mainstreaming and results orientation and is increasingly profiling an important 
complement to traditional Official Development Assistance and that is South-South 
co-operation. I want to take the opportunity that I am in Melbourne to praise the 
role of Australia in the area of trade capacity building, not only committing to 
support developing countries and in particular LDCs, but actually delivering on its 
commitments. The focus of the fourth Global Review of Aid for Trade in July 2013 
will be on ‘Connecting to Value Chains’. This will show how Aid for Trade can 
help developing countries create, access and benefit from value chains and will 
profile the private sector so that there is a better appreciation for what private actors 
look for when they invest in value chains in countries. 
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One final element before I close is on a Stakeholder Panel on Defining the Future of 
Trade which I established in April 2012 to analyse challenges to global trade 
opening in the 21st century and look at the drivers of today and tomorrow’s trade, 
and to examine trade patterns and what it means to open global trade in the 21st 
century. This very impressive group of individuals have been working assiduously 
on these issues and the findings of their work will be presented in the New Year. 
Much like Richard Snape’s intellectual work helped shape the Australian 
Productivity Commission, I believe the work of the Stakeholder Panel can provide a 
useful contribution to WTO and its Members as it continues to navigate this 
changing landscape of multilateral trade. 
I believe the future of the multilateral trading system is bright. It will be different — 
and in some cases unrecognisable — but bright. I am confident of that. 
